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STUDENT COMMENTS
HORIZONTAL MERGERS AND THE RESOURCE RESERVES
DEPLETION DEFENSE—UNITED STATES v. GENERAL
DYNAMICS CORP .
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1954, Material Service Corporation, a deep mining coal
producer, began acquiring the stock of the United Electric Coal
Companies, a strip mining coal producer.' Shortly after attaining
effective control of United Electric in 1959, 2 Material Service was
itself acquired by appellee General Dynamics Corporation, a large
conglomerate seeking to diversify its operations along non-defense
lines. 3 In 1966 United Electric became a wholly owned subsidiary of
General Dynamics and the conglomerate thereby became the na-
tion's fifth largest coal producer. 4
It was horizontal corporate growths of this nature, by com-
petitor acquisition rather than internal expansion or new entry, 6
which the Supreme Court, in a number of decisions during the
1960's, determined to be all but contrary to the general policy
underlying section 7 of the Clayton Act' of preserving fragmented
industries. 8 Now, twelve years after the seminal Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States 9 decision, during which period of time the Court
moved perilously close to a per se rule of illegality for horizontal
mergers," the majority opinion in United States v. General
I United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 488-89 (1974).
2 Id. at 489. Material Service then owned 34% of United Electric's outstanding shares.
Id.
3 Id.
• Id: at 489-90.
5 A merger is "horizontal" if it brings together enterprises at the same level of operation.
L. Schwartz, Free Enterprise and Economic Organization 130 (4th ed. 1972).
6 It would seem that new entry into an industry or market, not accompanied by a plan of
monopolization, comports with the congressional objective of promoting competition, by pro-
viding more competitors. Internal expansion, absent monopolistic practices, provides a
stronger competitor and may raise the general level of competition in an industry or market.
Growth by acquisition, on the other hand, if unaccompanied by entry of other firms, will
simply lead to an increase in economic concentration in the industry or market, with a smaller
number of firms controlling a larger proportion of the economic activity.
Markets may also be foreclosed by other means, such as requirements contracts; but
"integration by merger is more suspect than integration by contract, because of the greater
permanence of the former." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 366
(1963).
7 15 U.S.C. 18 (1970). See note 39 infra. Not all such acquisitions violate 7. See note
14 infra.
See note 18 infra.
9 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
'° See text at notes 25-38, 68-74 infra.
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Dynamics" indicates a reaffirmation of the essentially qualitative
approach to section 7 litigation set forth in Brown Shoe. 12
II. SECTION 7 MERGER ANALYSIS
The Clayton Act is intended to prevent the growth and domina-
tion of "trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and
before consummation." 13
 In the context of growth by merger and
acquisition, this means that if the resulting firm presents a probabil-
ity of anticompetitive effect, the merger will be prohibited." The
probability of such an effect is to be determined as of the time of the
merger;' 5 however, the requisite probability need not immediately
appear, and the Government may bring suit at any later date that
an anticompetitive effect becomes a substantial threat."
A major amendment of section 7 in 1950 clarified Congress'
desire that the validity of corporate acquisitions be evaluated not
merely as to competition foreclosed between the merging firms, but
also as to "their effect on competition generally in an economically
significant market." 7 Thus, the general aim of section 7 is to protect
competition, not competitors."
Probable anticompetitive effect must be found to exist within a
"line of commerce" and a "section of the country." The goal served
1 ' 415 U.S, 486 (1974).
12 370 U.S. at 321-22. The Court in General Dynamics rejected, for the first time under
the amended § 7, concentration statistics in deference to "other considerations" peculiar to the
coal industry. 415 U.S. at 497-98. It may be noted that the Government did not lose a Clayton
Act § 7 suit in the Supreme Court during the tenure of Chief Justice Warren (1953-69).
Providence Sunday Journal, Jan. 12, 1975, at F-10, col. 3.
13 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957), quoting S.
Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914) (emphasis deleted).
14
 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). "Statutes existed for
dealing with clear-cut menaces to competition; no statute was sought for dealing with
ephemeral possibilities." Id. At the same time, Congress intended to proscribe mergers only to
the extent that they may tend to lessen competition. Id. at 320. Some mergers might be
demonstrably procompetitive rather than anticompetitive, id. at 319, or their anticompetitive
effects might be de minimis. Id. at 329. Acquisition of a failing company may be in the public
interest when viewed against the certain economic dislocation engendered by its separate
demise. 415 U.S. at 507:
15
 Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), is directed at acquisitions, not the
subsequent use of power so obtained. L. Schwartz, Free Enterprise and Economic Organiza-
tion 183 (4th ed. 1972).
16
 United States v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (195 7 ).
"'Incipiency' in this context denotes not the time the stock was acquired, but any time when
the acquisition threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect." Id.
17
 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 335.
'a Id. at 320. At the same time, Congress felt that this goal was best served, even though
at occasionally higher costs and prices, by fragmented industries and markets. Id. at 344.
19
 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602,
618 (1974); du Pont, 353 U.S. at 593. Determination of a section of the country, or geographic
market, is necessary for traditional § 7 analysis. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S.
at 324. Geographic submarkets may be appropriate. Id. at 336. The Government need
establish only one such relevant market to satisfy the requirements of § 7. See Marine
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 621 n.20. The Government need not prove this market by "metes
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by defining the relevant market is the recognition of effective, realis-
tic "competition where, in fact, competition exists." 2° The line of
commerce, or product market, is determined initially by the reason-
able interchangeability of use between the products of the firms
under consideration and proposed substitutes for them. 21 Within
this broad market, "well-defined submarkets may exist which, in
themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes." 22
Furthermore, "[c]ompetition is not just rivalry among sellers. It is
rivalry for the custom of buyers. . . . Any definition of line of
commerce which ignores the buyers and focuses on what the sellers
do, or theoretically can do, is not meaningful." 23 The definition of a
product market is essentially a question of fact. 24
The anticompetitive effect of a merger is to be determined
through an analysis of the acquisition in the economic context of the
particular relevant market. 25 Ordinarily, this would require a com-
plicated and time consuming industry study as a prerequisite to an
informed prediction of the likelihood of future, substantial lessening
of competition. 26 Statistical market share information, however,
and bounds." United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966). The issue is not
where the merging parties do business or compete, but "where, within the area of competitive
overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and immediate." United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963). "The fact that two merging firms have
competed directly on the horizontal level in but a fraction of the geographic markets in which
either has operated, does not, in itself, place their merger outside the scope of § 7." Brown
Shoe, 370 U.S. at 337. See note 45 infra.
20
 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 326.
21 Id. at 325. This is essentially the "cellophane" test under the Sherman Act § 2, 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1970), developed in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S,
377, 395 (1956).
33 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325, citing du Pont, 353 U.S. at 593-95. "The boundaries of
such a submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or
public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar
characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices,
sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors." 370 U.S. at 325.
23 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp,, 168 F. Supp. 576, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Consumer practices may in fact lead to a product market which cuts across industry lines.
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 457 (1964), Products need not be
fungible to be considered within the same relevant market. Id. at 449.
26 Cass Student Advertising Inc. v. National Educ. Advertising Servs., Inc., 374 F.
Supp. 796, 800 & n.6 (N.D. III. 1974). But cf. L. Schwartz, Free Enterprise and Economic
Organization 101 (4th ed. 1972). That it is a question of fact is important. "The findings and
conclusions of the District Court are . . . governed by the 'clearly erroneous' standard of Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a) just as fully on direct appeal to [the Supreme Court] as when a civil case
is being reviewed by a court of appeals." 415 U.S. at 508. The Court in General Dynamics
specifically declined to reach the issue of product market definition, id. at 510, but one may
infer that, as a fact question, the definition of product market would also be subject to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 52(a). Thus, since the analysis of substantial anticompetitive effect is dependent
upon the size and characteristics of a relevant market, the Government's success in merger
suits could become highly contingent upon the fact finding of the district court in the first
instance, Most significantly, the application of Rule 52(a) to the issue of relevant product
market could lead to seemingly inconsistent results in seemingly similar situations. Cass, 374
F. Supp. at 802. See text at notes 110-14, 147-48 infra.
25 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 321-22, 328-29.
26 Id. at 329.
761
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
"provide[s] a graphic picture of the immediate impact of a
merger,"27 and, in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 28
the Court decided that in certain cases the elaborate proof of market
structure, market behavior, and probable anticompetitive effect
would be unnecessary. 29 Instead, a strong presumption of illegality
was said to arise whenever the resulting market share of the merged
firms is high and contributes to a significant rise in the economic
concentration in that market. 3 ° The Court recently explained in
General Dynamics:
The effect of adopting this approach to a determination of
a "substantial" lessening of competition is to allow the
Government to rest its case on a showing of even small
increases of market share or market concentration in those
industries or markets where concentration is already great
or has been recently increasing, since "if concentration is
already great, the importance of preventing even slight
increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility
of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great." 3 '
United States v. Von's Grocery Co. 32 presented the exact threat
of concentration that Congress wished to halt. 33 An observable
decline in the number of single groceries, coupled with an increase
in the number of chain store operations in the Los Angeles food
retailing market (much of that growth credited to acquisitions of
smaller competitors by larger companies), led the Court to invali-
date the merger of two aggressive competitors based on market
share projections and trends. 34
Similarly, in United States v. Continental Can Co. 35 a merger
between the second and sixth largest producers in the combined
metal and glass container market, resulting in a twenty-five percent
market share for the acquiring firm in an already concentrated
" Id. at 343 n.70.
20 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
29 Id. at 362-63.
39
 Id. at 363. The Court declined to decide the smallest market share which would be so
inherently suspect, but found the 30% share of the merged commercial banks, and the
combined share of 59% for the top two banks in the relevant market, to be a clear anticom-
petitive threat. Id. at 364-65. It should be noted, however, that the Court indicated that this
numerical test did not invalidate the earlier statement in Brown Shoe that between the
extremes, where foreclosure is neither of monopoly nor de minimis proportions, market shares
are not decisive. See id. at 362-63; Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 329.
31 415 U.S. at 497.
32 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
33 Id. at 277. In 1958 Von's ranked third in the Los Angeles retail food market and
Shopping Bag, the chain acquired by Von's in 1960, ranked sixth, in terms of net sales. In
1960, their combined sales were 7.5% of the total market. Id. at 272. The top four had 24.4%
of sales; the top eight, 40.9%; and the top twelve, 48.8%. Id. at 281. The increase in
concentration in the market as a result of the merger attributable to the top four was 18%; the
top eight, 7.6%; and the top twelve, 2.5%. 415 U.S. at 495 n.7.
34 384 U.S. at 272-73, 278.
33 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
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market, was held to be illega1. 36 In United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 37 the acquisition of Rome Cable Corporation, producers
of only 1.3 percent of the total bare and insulated aluminum electri-
cal power cable in the industry, by Alcoa, who held 27.8 percent of
the same market, was declared inherently anticompetitive in view of
the small but certain increase in concentration expected from the
merge r. 38
III. General Dynamics
In reliance upon the Court's past sensitivity to even minor
increases in concentration, the Justice Department brought suit
against successor General Dynamics alleging that the acquisition of
United Electric by Material Service in 1959 had presented a sub-
stantial likelihood of anticompetitive effect in the production and
sale of coal in either or both of two midwestern markets, in violation
of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 39
The district court" rejected the Government's claims. Analyz-
ing the historical changes in the demand for coa141 and the corres-
ponding changes in the coal industry which reflected the "long term"
orientation of the electric utility market, coal's mainstay among
modern consumers, 42 the court found the evolution to fewer and
larger coal companies "inevitable."43 It then defined the relevant
product market for section 7 purposes as "energy" in general,
finding significant competition from other fuels such as oil, natural
gas and uranium." The court specifically rejected coal as a distinct
submarket within which to analyze the anticompetitive effects of the
merger. 45
36 Id. at 459-61.
37 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
31 Id. at 278, 280. The top two firms in the market already held 50% of the business; the
top five, 76%. Id. at 278.
39
 Id. at 490. Clayton Act	 7, 15 U.S.C. 4 18 (1970), provides in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock ... of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly. . . .
" United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. III. 1972).
4 ' Id. at 538-39, 545. Prominent among the changes were the dieselization of the
railroads and increasing competition from other fuels in the home heating market. Id. at 545.
Air pollution restrictions have had and will likely continue to have a great effect on coal usage
in the future. Id. at 553-54. Counterbalancing that effect will undoubtedly be shifting relative
costs among the competing fuels. See id. at 540, 544.
42 Id. at 539, 543.
43 Id. at 543-44.
" Id. at 555-56.
43 Id. at 555. See text at notes 110-14 infra. The Government had offered as the relevant
geographic market the state of Illinois, and in the alternative, a wider, industry recognized
sales region known as the Eastern Interior Coal Province. 341 F. Supp. at 556. The district
court, however, preferred greater refinement in delineating the effective area of competition
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The Government sought to prove the probable anticompetitive
effect of the merger by utilizing a statistical market share/market
concentration analysis. 46 However, the district court rejected the
detailed showing, deeming it wholly inapposite to the competitive
realities of coal as an extractive industry doing business primarily
through long term requirements contracts. 47
On direct appeal," the Supreme Court concluded that the
Government's statistical proof failed to establish a likely anticom-
petitive effect from the acquisition in any market, in view of other
pertinent considerations affecting the coal industry and United Elec-
tric. 49
 The Court held that in an extractive industry, a merger
among competitors where the acquired firm lacks sufficient resource
reserves to compete effectively in the future, does not present a
probable anticompetitive effect and therefore does not violate sec-
tion 7.
Agreeing that competition among energy producers supplying
the electric utility market is primarily for requirements contracts, 5 °
the Court concluded, as had the district court," that a coal pro-
ducer must have adequate resource reserves to ensure its future
ability to perform and thereby maintain its competitive position. 52
United Electric's coal reserves prospects for the future were found to
be "unpromising,"53
 and therefore the firm could not be considered
a competitive force. 54
 Since United Electric could not contribute
meaningfully to competition standing alone, the merger with Mate-
rial Service was deemed to not affect competition adversely, and
accordingly there was no violation of section 7. 55
The Supreme Court adopted the district court's "reserves
analysis"56 without reaching the issue of whether the district court
had properly defined the relevant market." Indeed, the Court
and defined the geographic market in terms of ICC freight rate districts. Id. at 556-57. See
note 19 supra.
46 341 F. Supp. at 558, 560. See 415 U.S. at 494-96 (tables). Past decisions had found § 7
violations based on aggregate statistics comparable to those utilized in General Dynamics. See
cases cited at General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 494 n.6, 496. See text at notes 27-38 supra. "It is
not the absolute size of a business unit that is significant, but its size in relation to the size of
the market in which it operates." C. Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business 89 (3d ed.
1966). But see text at notes 68-74 infra.
47 341 F. Supp. at 541, 543-44, 560.
43 The appeal to the Supreme Court was pursuant to the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29
(1970). 415 U.S. at 488.
49
 415 U.S. at 510-11.
5°
 Id. at 501.
S 1 341 F. Supp. at 559.
52 415 U.S. at 502.
53 Id., quoting 341 F. Supp. at 559. All but 7.7% of United Electric's 52 million tons of
economically mineable reserves were under contract at the time of the trial. .341 F. Supp. at
538.
54
 415 U.S. at 503-04, 509-10.
55 Id. at 503-04, 510.
56 Id. at 498, 506-08.
57 Id. at 511.
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deemed the lower court's attempt at such definition "superfluous,""
because, irrespective of the markets within which Material Service
and United Electric might be found to compete, the Government's
statistical showing did not establish a probability of substantial
anticompetitive effect. 59
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the district
court had in fact applied the "failing company doctrine" 60 to the
1959 merger without requiring the defendant to meet that defense's
traditionally narrow requirements. 6 ' In addition, he indicated that
the lower court failed to make any findings as of the time of the
merger, and thus had relied solely on post acquisition evidence. 62
Justice Douglas noted certain relevant factors, not considered in the
court below, with respect to United Electric's future potential,
which would have diminished the conclusiveness ascribed to the
firm's presently unpromising reserves position. 63 Finally, he
criticized the majority's failure to determine the proper relevant
market, " 'a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of the
Clayton Act . . . "64 Noting that inter-industry competition did
not preclude the finding of a relevant single industry submarket, 65
Justice Douglas found coal to have price advantages and operational
disadvantages so unique as to warrant recognition as a separate
submarket for section 7 purposes. 66
58 Id.
54 Id.
60
 See text at notes 87-98 infra. This had been the Government's position. 415 U.S. at
506.
61 Id. at 523 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 523-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "The value of post-merger evidence seems more
than offset by the difficulties encountered in obtaining it." FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568, 593 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Even extensive post acquisition evidence will
not conclusively negate the possibility of anticompetitive effects. See FTC v, Consolidated
Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965).
63 415 U.S. at 524-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The firm still owned deep shaft reserves
and, at any time after 1959, might have reacquired its then recent deep mining expertise; or
changing economies and technology might have rendered the reserves it owned or could
acquire economically mineable. Id.
64 Id. at 513 (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. E.1. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
65 415 U.S. at 514-15 (Douglas, J., dissenting), citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 377 U.S. 271, 275 (1964), and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325
(1962).
" 415 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Coal burning facilities are specialized and
not readily adaptable to other fuels, and therefore there is little interfuel price sensitivity. Id.
at 517. The district court had based its finding of significant interfuel competition on the
design and conversion stages of electric generating facilities, at which point all fuels are
technically available. See 341 F. Supp. at 545-50. Justice Douglas' point relates to the
operational stages, where a fuel type has been locked in. See 415 U.S. at 517. The lower court
appeared to acknowledge that competition at least among coal suppliers for a given customer
terminates when design decisions have been made and a requirements contract has been
negotiated. See 341 F. Supp. at 542, 543. Logically, interfuel competition ends at that point as
well, barring multi-fuel capability, until subsequent conversion. Accepting present technologi-
cal limitations, see In re Kennecott Copper Corp., 98 F.T.C. 744, 915 (1971), aff'd sub nom.
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This comment has briefly examined the case law of horizontal
mergers under section 7 of the Clayton Act. It will now attempt to
place General Dynamics in perspective under that law, with respect
to (1) the depleted resource reserves analysis as an approach to
determining the probability of anticompetitive effect; and (2) the
district court's "energy" market definition and the Supreme Court's
subsequent characterization of any market definition as "superflu-
ous" under the reserves analysis. 67
IV. THE BREAKTHROUGH
The Von's—Continental Can—Alcoa line of decisions, stressing
"bigness" to the possible exclusion of other considerations, drew
strong criticism. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Von's, asserted that
the Court's startling "per se" approach failed to appraise the merger
within the realities of the contemporary retail food industry in
highly urbanized Los Angeles. 68 Citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 69 he reasserted the necessity of a proper industry and
market study," except in the "specialized situation" represented by
Philadelphia National Bank. 7 ' He further declared that the major-
ity had failed to demonstrate any connection between an increase in
market share and an increase in market power." Rather, Stewart
suggested, the concentration in Von's was a natural result of market
evolution. 73 The feeling spread among certain Justices that the
quantitative emphasis was even distorting the majority's perceptions
of relevant markets. 74
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909
(1974), the design and conversion stages are the more appropriate points to observe. See text
at notes 115-21 infra.
67
 415 U.S. at 410-11. The geographic market definition is beyond the scope of this
comment.
66 384 U.S. at 282-83 (Stewart, J., dissenting). "Section 7 was never intended by
Congress for use by the Court as a charter to roll back the supermarket revolution." Id. at
288.
" 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
7° 384 U.S. at 282 & n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The purpose of such a study would be
to determine underlying trends and changes which concentration ratios alone would obscure.
71
 Id. at 301-02 & n.35 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Stewart apparently was referring to the
fact that the merger in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank would result in a 33% increase in concentra-
tion, in an already concentrated market. 374 U.S. at 364-65. See text at note 30 supra. Justice
Stewart viewed the Von's statistics as mild in comparison, and indeed when viewed against
market exit and entry statistics, indicative of successful, thriving competition. 384 U.S. at
298-30.
72
 Id. at 297 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
73 Id. at 288, 289 n.14 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Small competitors, however, remained
strong. Id. at 298-301.
74 See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 555 (1966) (Harlan &
Stewart, JJ.,. concurring); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 283-85
(1964) (Stewart, Harlan & Goldberg, JJ., dissenting). The skepticism carried over into
Sherman Act § 2 litigation, see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 590-93 (1966)•
(Fortas & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
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The breakthrough came in General Dynamics. This time, it
was the majority opinion which rejected the Government's other-
wise proper quantitative market case in deference to other qualita-
tive factors unique to the coal industry." The "other considerations"
upon which both the district court and Supreme Court focused were
the nature of modern competitive marketing in the coal industry and
United Electric's inability to participate further within that
framework. 76 Traditional market share analysis stresses the position
of power occupied by each of the merging firms, as well as the
resulting firm. Power, which may be expressed in terms of past sales
or production statistics, primarily signifies the relative ability of
firms to influence the variables of the marketplace and the actions of
competitors." In a truly competitive market, they are unable to do
either. 78 The Court explained that the assumption usually is made
that a company, which is strong in the relevant market in the recent
past, will continue to be strong in the near future. 79 In markets
exhibiting a tendency toward concentration, such companies are
forbidden from merging by section 7 because of their presumed
ability to continue to dominate." ,On this basis, the Government
had shown an apparent Violation."
But, the Court warned, "[elvidence of past production does not;
as a matter of logic, necessarily give a proper picture of a company's
future ability to compete. " 82 Indeed, in the coal industry, production
statistics were found to be less significant than coal reserves statis-
tics. 83 The Court, adopting the district court's analysis, perceived
the strongest competitors in the coal industry to be those companies
with the greatest uncommitted recoverable reserves."
At the time of the trial, United Electric had minimal uncommit-
ted reserves and was unable to acquire new resources." Thus, the
75 415 U.S. at 497-98.
76 Id. at 501-03; 341 F. Supp. at 539, 543, 559.
77 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
43-44 (1955).
71 R. Lipsey & P. Steiner, Economics 251-52 (1966).
79 415 U.S. at 501.
1° Id. The Clayton Act emphasizes the probability of such an effect, not its certainty. 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1970). See text at notes 13-16 supra.
°' 415 U.S. at 495-96. After the acquisition of United Electric, General Dynamics,
through its subsidiary Material Service, ranked second in the Eastern Interior Coal Province
Sales Area with a 12.4% market share, and first in Illinois with a 23.2% market share. The
1959 share of the top two coal producers in Illinois but for the merger would have been
36.6%; given the merger, it was 44.3%, an estimated 22.4% increase. In 1967, but for the
merger it would have been 44.0%; given the merger, it was 52.9%, a 20.2% increase. Id. at
495, 496 (tables).
12 Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
°) Id. at 501-02.
84 Id.
" Id. at 503. Its 52 million tons of economically mineable reserves represented less than
1% of the total midwestern reserves of the thirty-seven coal producers in Illinois, Indiana, and
western Kentucky. Moreover, only 4 million of the firm's 52 million tons of reserves were not
committed under a long-term contract. 341 F. Supp. at 538. But see note 63 supra.
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Court did not consider the company to be an effective competitive
force for the future and therefore the merger presented no substan-
tial likelihood of anticompetitive effect. 86
V. THE FAILING COMPANY DOCTRINE IN DISGUISE
In response to the Government's assertions, the Supreme Court
expressly denied that this new "resource defense" was tantamount to
the failing company doctrine." As recognized in International Shoe
Co. v. FTC , 88
 that doctrine provides a defense to section 7 charges
for mergers meeting two requirements: (1) the "resources" of the
acquired firm must be so depleted and the possibility of rehabilita-
tion so remote that business failure is gravely imminent; and (2)
prospective purchasers other than the acquiring competitor must be
unavailable. 89 The acquired firm must fulfill these requirements at
least as of the time of the merger. 9°
While section 7 is silent on the point, it would appear to be part
of the statutory scheme that the acquisition of a firm on the verge of
business collapse cannot result in the requisite probable lessening of
competition necessary to sustain a violation." The Supreme Court
has indicated its desire to retain the failing company doctrine's
narrow scope as well as the requirement that one who asserts the
defense must prove its conditions. 92
In General Dynamics, the Court characterized the resource
defense as entirely different in thrust from the failing company
doctrine. The former, it said, "went to the heart of the Govern-
ment's statistical prima facie case" 93 by demonstrating that the
acquired firm could not effectively compete in the future, whereas the
latter dealt with the "entirely different point" of whether the ac-
quired firm would be able to stay in business absent the merger. 94
I° 415 U.S. at 508, 511.
612 Id. at 506, 508. "Resource defense" is the author's own term.
as 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
19 Id. at 302. These are usually financial resources; however, non-financial resources
have also figured in discussions of the defense. E.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 376 U.S. 651, 661 (1964) (natural gas reserves); United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F.
Supp. 962, 978-79 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (crude oil reserves). See Blum, The Failing Company
Doctrine, 16 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 75, 91-94 (1974).
A third requirement, added later, that the prospects of reorganization through receiver-
ship or bankruptcy must be dim or non-existent, Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394
U.S. 131, 138 (1969), appears to have been dropped, or at least subsumed under the first
requirement. United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971).
9°
 Citizen Publishing Co. v United States, 394 U.S. 131, 137 (1969); United States Steel
Corp. v FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 610 (6th Cir. 1970).
91
 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808
(D.D.C. 1958), aff'd on other grounds, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). Congress has expressed approval
of the doctrine. S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950); H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
92 Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1969). See generally
Blum, supra note 89.
93
 415 U.S. at 508.
94 Id.
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Since the issue was framed as inability to compete in the future, the
Court continued, post acquisition evidence was highly pertinent to
the analysis, because "unlike evidence showing only that no lessen-
ing of competition has yet occurred, the demonstration of weak coal
reserves necessarily and logically implied that United Electric was
not merely disinclined but unable to compete effectively for future
contracts. "95
It is submitted that the Court ignored the practical meaning of
its own explanation of the resource defense, thereby raising a dis-
tinction without a difference. If a company, for whatever reason,
cannot effectively compete, then in a competitive market it will in
due time fail. By the district court's findings, which the Supreme
Court affirmed, 96
 United Electric need only have committed its
remaining four million tons of reserves to a utility customer, and its
future ability to sell coal at all would have disappeared. At that
point, barring access to new reserves, which was explicitly found
not to exist, 97
 United Electric's only surviving business activity
would have been to service its outstanding prior contracts. There
would appear to be no real difference between a company that is
doomed to fail in the near future and one that qualifies for failing
company status. If there is no hope of survival without a necessary
resource, replenishment of which is unavailable to the company, the
failing company doctrine is, it is submitted, the sole legally accepted
means by which to avoid an otherwise proper section 7 challenge. 98
If the Court in General Dynamics truly intended to broaden the
scope of the failing company doctrine, it should have clearly de-
lineated the new standards for future application of that doctrine.
Furthermore, it is suggested that the Court should have qual-
ified its apparent unabashed acceptance of purely post acquisition
data in support of the depleted resources analysis. The traditional
failing company defense must attach at least as of the time of
merger. 99
 As Justice .Douglas indicated in dissent, there was no
showing that United Electric was anything but a going concern in
1959, and therefore that there was no probability of anticompetitive
effect at the time of the merger 'or, for that matter, at any time prior
to the trial.'" It is submitted that if one accepts the value of the
95 Id. at 506.
96 Id. at 508.
97 341 F. Supp. at 560.
98 Indeed, while discussing the majority's concern for United Electric's exhausted re-
serves, Justice Douglas states: "Although the doctrine was not invoked by name, this appears
to be an application of the 'failing company' defense," 415 U.S. at 523 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
99 See text at note 90 supra.
1 " Id. at 524-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting). United Electric had a good name and a
thriving coal marketing structure at the time of the acquisition and beyond. Id. at 525. Many
of the commitments which reduced the firm's reserves occurred considerably after the acquisi-
tion. Id. at 524. There was no finding that additional mineable strip reserves were unavailable
in 1959, nor any as to whether the presently unmineable reserves owned by United Electric
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defendant's post acquisition data, due consideration should also be
accorded to time of merger evidence and proof of anticompetitive
effect subsequent to the merger but preceding the section 7 chal-
lenge. Otherwise, the resource defense could provide a "cure" for
any undue competitive advantage which may have accrued to the
firms after the date of merger, but prior to that time when the
acquired firm ceased to be competitively functional."" The de-
mands of the Clayton Act will then have been nullified.
VI. AN OLD DEFENSE OR A CHANGE IN ANALYSIS?
On the other hand, General Dynamics may be an indication, of
a shift in attitude on the Court toward a more qualitative applica-
tion of the policies behind the Clayton Act in an ever changing
economy. Such an approach to section 7 is not without precedent.
The Court in Philadelphia National Bank had stated that mergers
resulting in high market shares and undue concentration must be
enjoined, but only "in the absence of evidence clearly showing that
the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects." 102 In
fact, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, "3 the Court had charac-
terized as one possible mitigating factor "the inadequate resources of
one of the parties [which may prevent] it from maintaining its
competitive position. ),104 If the Court has determined to pursue
actively an analysis of "other considerations" in section 7 litigation,
then General Dynamics, though perhaps not as succintly written as
might be wished, may prove to be a significant and beneficial
antitrust decision. It would certainly seem ill-advised to ignore the
predominant means of competition in the coal industry when it is
competition which the Clayton Act deems worthy of protection. 105
It would be irresponsible not to recognize depletion of natural re-
sources as a limiting factor on the vitality of a firm whose entire
business is, in effect, such depletion. It is not unreasonable to draw
logical inferences from presently existing facts rather than pursue a
Pyrrhic victory on the basis of facts which no longer obtain, espe-
cially where the disruption attending divestiture is at stake. 106 Yet,
were unrnineable in 1959. Id. The majority considered such factors insignificant under the
reserves analysis. Id. at 507.
101 While private treble damage suits are authorized by § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 15 (1970), in the absence of a litigated judgment in favor of the Government, such
actions are tremendously difficult to institute and prosecute successfully. L. Schwartz, Free
Enterprise and Economic Organization 18 (4th ed. 1972).
102
 374 U.S. at 363.
1 °3 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
t" Id. at 346. No such condition was present in Brown Shoe. Id.
los See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
tee
 Actually, the hardships of divestiture are better considered in the district court at the
remedy stage, rather than on appeal as to the law. In General Dynamics, the district court,
however, may have given this matter consideration sub silentio without ever reaching the
remedy stage. See 341 F. Supp. at 560.
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this philosophical shift should not have been buried within an
opinion which seems to attempt to conceal that very change.
It is submitted that the resource defense is, in truth, a form of
the failing company defense, adapted to the realities of coal produc-
tion and marketing. It does not make an entirely different point, but
the same point in an unusual context. Nonetheless, the mere utiliza-
tion of this defense in General Dynamics suggests that the Court
may be willing to pursue a qualitative examination of economic
factors in attempting to ascertain the true competitive impact of an
acquisition under section 7. It appears that the Court may no longer
place total reliance on the superficial certainty provided by a purely
statistical analysis. The affirmance of the reserves analysis will
hopefully serve to encourage the district courts to do the same. 1 07
VII. THE RELEVANT MARKET: ENERGY OR COAL?
Surprisingly, however, the Court felt it could apply this qual-
itative defense and then declare that it did not require the "neces-
sary predicate" of market definition.'° 8
 This, too, is a significant
break with past case law. It would appear evident that without a
relevant market, there can be no consideration of historical trends
toward concentration, which is, of course, precisely what the Court
had said was unnecessary under the reserves analysis. 1 °9
Moreover, by avoiding the market definition issue, the Court
left standing a conflict over the significance of inter-industry competi-
tion between coal and other fuels. In Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
FTC,'" the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held; "The coal industry is a distinct submarket which has charac-
teristics which are not shared by the other fuel industries. . .
[O]ther fuels appear to have a limited [competitive] effect."'"
I' Indeed, the judiciary could adopt a treatment of
	 7 cases not unlike that now
accorded to bank mergers under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970),
which directs consideration to whether the public interest in "meeting the convenience and
needs of the community to be served" outweighs the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
merger. 12 U.S.C. 1828(c)(5)(B) (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 352-53, 367 (1970); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S.
171, 181-82 (1968).
ma 415 U.S. at 510.
199
 Id. The Court did, however, note that the trend toward concentration was a natural
result of the market shift to supplying large utility consumers. Id. at 492-93. Compare this
with justice Stewart's analogous point in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,
288-89 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
1 " 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
' 11 467 F.2d at 79.
[Allthough there is an economic basis for . . . espousal of a total energy market .. .
the record establishes the existence of a distinct coal industry as a submarket of such
a broader market. There is industry, Goverment, and public recognition of the coal
industry as a separate economic entity; and coal has peculiar characteristics and uses,
as well as specialized vendors and distinct customers.
In re Kennecott Copper Corp., 78 F.T.C. 744, 763 (1971) (Hearing Examiner). "The appro-
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The findings of fact of the Federal Trade Commission in Ken-
necott and the district court in General Dynamics regarding the
economic history, industry structure, and current parameters of coal
marketing were in general agreement.'" Yet, in Kennecott the
relevant product market was defined as coal,'" whereas in General
Dynamics it. was found to be energy.'" This conflict, it is submit-
ted, is a direct result of the application of different approaches to the
issue of relevant product market definition.
As noted earlier, electric utilities have, through an historical
process of elimination, become the main customers of the coal
producers.'" Competition for these customers therefore quite
naturally has taken its form from the needs of the electric generating
industry. 116 The tremendous investment represented by a new
generating facility requires that a fuel source be chosen in its design
stage, at least for the medium run, if not for the life of the facil-
ity.'" Consequently, the limited competition that exists among fuel
sources is primarily directed to this initial period.'" Once a facility
is "captured" under a long term requirements contract, competition
for its future business is effectively foreclosed, not only from other
coal suppliers (except for occasional spot purchases) but, for the
most part, from other fuel sources as well.' 19
Finding this early stage interfuel competition " 'insistent, con-
tinuous, effective and quantitywise very substantial,' " 120 the dis-
trict court in General Dynamics decided that the relevant product
market must encompass interfuel competition, and therefore defined
the market as energy.' 21
 Primary reliance for this approach was
placed on Continental Can Co. v. United States. 122
priateness of ... coal as the line of commerce is so clear that no elaborate citation of authority
is required." Id. at 897.
The initial Hearing Examiner was inclined to consider the impact of interfuel competi-
tion, 78 F.T.C. at 763 (Hearing Examiner), but the opinion of the Commissioners rejected
such consideration as an overstatement. Id. at 915, 916.
112 Compare General Dynamics, 341 F. Supp. at 538-45 with Kennecott, 78 F.T.C. at
795-99 (Hearing Examiner).
" 3
 78 F.T.C. at 915.
14
 341 F. Supp. at 556.
111
 Id. at 539; 78 F.T.C. at 796 (Hearing Examiner). See text at notes 41-42 supra.
16
 341 F. Supp. at 542-43. Such contracts are beneficial to the coal producers who make
sizeable operational investments based theron, as well as to the utilities who need assurance of
continued supply for uninterrupted service. Id. at 543. The propriety of long term require-
ments contracts with utilities in spite of their inherent foreclosure of competition for long
periods of time was determined in Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashvitle Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320,
334-35 (1961).
"2
 See 341 F. Supp. at 542, 543.
Lill Id.
" 9 Id.
1 " Id. at 556, quoting United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 453 (1964).
12 ' 341 F. Supp. at 556. Midwest coal consumers were found typically to be large utility
and industrial corporations, sophisticated in the energy market. Fuel purchasing decisions
were found to be consistently based primarily on comparison of coal with other fuels. Id. at
555.
122
 378 U.S. 441 (1964). In Continental Can, glass and metal containers were placed in
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The FTC in Kennecott, on the other hand, placed its emphasis
on the submarket indicia test set out in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States' 23
 and accordingly found coal as a product market distinct
from all other fuels. 124
 The divergence in approach is significant:
Continental Can looks at competition as it occurs to define the
common "industry;" 125 whereas Brown Shoe looks at the distin-
guishing characteristics of the product itself to determine its likely
competition.' 26
 Both approaches yield a relevant product market.
The inquiry thus becomes: when is either applied, and was the
approach followed in General Dynamics correct? It is suggested that
the two approaches are viewed by the courts as complementary: one
or the other is applied according to whether the main product under
consideration is perceived by the court (1) as an ultimate commod-
ity; or (2) as a component of a process.
VIII. MARKET DEFINITION BASED ON PRODUCT USAGE
A product may be said to be in commodity usage when its
purchase is primarily for the immediate satisfaction of a finite,
self-limiting need. The commodity user generally requires an end
product to satisfy this perceived need. 127
 Process usage, on the other
hand, involves the purchase of one product in order that it may be
applied to the creation of a second product, the identity of the first
being totally subsumed within the identity of the second. The pro-
cess user can vary the means by which he arrives at the final
product. Thus, while the commodity user enters the market in
search of the product which most nearly satisfies his definite need,
the process user is not so constrained. Industrial processes, espe-
cially, can be altered and adapted to varying "raw inputs," given an
appropriate time period and an economic incentive to do so.' 28
Where a court conceives of commodity usage as the principal
the same relevant product market in view of the general confrontation between the two: while
not immediately interchangeable because of differing machinery, either type of container
could usually be used to hold the same contents. And, as the Court found, there was an
exchange between the two over time. 378 U.S. at 453-55. Therefore, because each industry
also recognized that its competition included the other, the Court grouped them in the same
market. Id. at 457. Justice Harlan dissented, viewing the majority's approach to market
definition as backward, see id. at 467-68, and the definition itself as an invention "which no
one . . . imagined [existed]; for which businessmen and economists will look in vain; .. .
which sprang into existence only when the merger took place and will cease to exist when the
merger is undone." Id. at 476-77. justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion in General
Dynamics, joined in this dissent. Id. at 467.
"3
 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
124
 78 F.T.C. at 915.
12 ' 378 U.S. at 453-55.
' 26
 370 U.S. at 325.
"7
 Shoes are an example of a product in commodity usage. They satisfy the need to
protect one's feet.
I" For example, coal is generally in process usage: boiler coal produces heat energy,
which is used to produce steam to generate electricity. 341 F. Supp. at 545. Metallurgical coal
is used to make iron. Cf. id. at 536.
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use for the products of horizontally merging firms, it will tend to
choose the Brown Shoe approach to market definition. This ap-
proach focuses on similarities and differences in function, appear-
ance, price, quality and the like to arrive at narrower submarkets on
the basis of differentiati characteristics. Any such factor is ap-
propriate for consideratio from the outset under the Brown Shoe
approach. 129
Conversely, when a court perceives process usage to be the
primary use for the products, it will likely employ the Continental
Can approach. Under this approach, a court determines which
products are used interchangeably over time as inputs in the process
to ascertain where the competition exists, rather than attempting to
assemble the likely competition on the basis of differentiating
characteristics which mayi. pose no problem at all to a process user
able to select and vary his methods. 13 °
It is submitted that each approach has much to recommend it.
It is sensible and sound from the standpoint of classical economics to
regard as truly competitive only those products which are substitut-
ible for the same uses and which bear further peculiar similarities to
each other sufficient to separate them from other products which
less perfectly fulfill a perceived finite need. It is equally sensible,
albeit more intuitive, to view competition as it exists in the recogni-
tion and marketing conduct of the public and the supposed com-
petitors themselves.' 3 ' As the guiding purpose of the antitrust laws
is the protection of competition, 132
 the courts cannot tailor the
product market to fit the business of the defendant in disregard of
the realities of the marketplace.' 33
The course of section 7 decisions lends support to the above
analysis. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 134
aluminum electrical power cable was found to be a submarket
separate from copper electrical cable by applying the Brown Shoe
tests to determine a strong differentiating factor: price. Aluminum
cable was being considered in a commodity usage—power transmis-
129
 370 U.S. at 325.
139
 378 U.S. at 453-55.
131
 Support for this approach is indeed also found in Brown Shoe. 370 U.S. at 326.
However, the Court suggested that this test was appropriate only for determining the "outer
boundaries of the product market." Id. at 325. Moreover, the Court appeared to place greater
emphasis on the interchangeability resulting from the characteristics shared by certain prod-
ucts rather than that resulting from the existence of marketplace competition. See id.
132
 Id. at 320.
133
 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 590 (1966) (Fortes, 3., dissenting).
Given perfect knowledge, either approach should yield the same market definition; the
evidence itself would make clear the applicability of the right approach. However in the usual
case, where the evidence is less than perfect, more depends upon the initial choice of approach
by the district court. A wrong choice will affect the analysis of the relevant market, even to
the point of yielding a distortion of reality. Set text at notes 144-46 infra.
134
 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
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sion lines. 135 In United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 136 the
Supreme Court reversed the district court's finding of two separate
lines of commerce—printing of color comic strip supplements for
syndicates engaged in the sale of copyrighted strips to newspapers
and printing of color comic strips for papers that do not print their
own—favoring a broader market rather than submarkets which
might be indicated by Brown Shoe indicia. ' 37 Noting that a printing
firm could really do either, and that one type of comic strip supple-
ment was functionally no different from the other, the Court defined
the market as printing and distribution of comic strip supple-
ments.' 38 "Comic strip supplements" are a product in a process
usage—the assemblage of a newspaper which can contain either
syndicated or unsyndicated strips. 39
Clearly a situation can present itself where even in a process
usage a product will be so distinctive that its users will treat it as a
non-fungible component in the production process and thus justify
its placement in a separate submarket. The creation of a submarket
in this instance is entirely consistent with the Continental Can
approach because it is the result of judicial recognition of the mar-
ket's competitive realities. In United States v. Pennzoil Co. 140
Pennsylvania grade crude oil was found to be distinct from all other
crude oils for refining, a process usage, because the petroleum
industry recognized it as a separate entity, which commanded a
premium price, was easy to refine and had a reputation as being of
the highest quality, 141 Similarly, the district court in General
1 " Id. at 274-77.
136 402 U,S. 549 (1971).
137
	 at 552-53.
138
 Id. at 552.
139
 The following cases also lend support to the theory propounded in the text: United
States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 660-66 (1974) (commercial banking credit,
Continental Can applied);Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., — F.2d
(9th Cir. 1975) (refreshment concession franchises, Continental Can applied); United
States v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,873, at 95869, 95872-73
(M.D. Pa. 1974) (artificial Christmas trees, Brown Shoe applied); United States v. Crowell,
Collier, & MacMillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983, 990, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (marching band
uniforms were distinguished from police and usher uniforms, Brown Shoe applied; but blazers
were found to be interchanged with military style marching band uniforms, Continental Can
applied); In re American Brake Shoe Co., 73 F.T.C. 610, 674-75 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Abex
Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d 928, 931-32 (6th Cir. 1970) (sintered metal friction materials, Brown
Shoe applied); United States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606, 617-18 (C.D. Cal.
1967) (daily newspapers, Brown Shoe applied; Continental Can quoted in warning against
unduly broad markets). But see, Elco Corp. v. Microdot Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741, 747-49 (D.
Del. 1973) (metal plate connector subassemblies; both Brown Shoe and Continental Can
applied).
140 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
141 Id. at 973. Brown Shoe contains a statement which supports the Continental Can
approach. 370 U.S. at 325. See note 120 supra. Similarly, there is language in Continental Can
which supports the Brown Shoe approach. 378 U.S. at 449, 453. However, it is submitted
that this dicta does not undermine the theory propounded in the text, but rather lends support
to it by showing the existence of two different approaches moving in two different directions.
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Dynamics impliedly acknowledged the existence of characteristics
unique to coal. 142 It found, however, in the context of the usage
under consideration, that competition from other fuel sources
existed and, following Continental Can, necessitated a broader mar-
ket definition. 143
It is submitted that to the extent that other fuels compete with
coal in the electric utility energy supply market, they are appro-
priately considered in the same relevant market, applying Continen-
tal Can, even though an application of Brown Shoe would indicate
considerable characteristic differences among the fuels. At the de-
sign and conversion stages, which are the only real stages of compe-
tition, relative costs of fuels are more determinative than characteris-
tic differences.'" As noted, the FTC in Kennecott defined coal as
the relevant market in reliance on Brown Shoe indicia.' 45 As Ken-
necott involved coal in the same process usage as that considered in
General Dynamics, it would seem that, if the above analysis is
correct, Kennecott was wrongly decided.'"
An alternative explanation may be that in Kennecott the FTC
was presented with more, better and certainly different evidence
pointing to coal as a distinct submarket than was the district court
in General Dynamics. 147 If so, then the conclusion must be reached
that the conflict is the unfortunate but inevitable result of the dual
system of enforcement of section 7. 148 Yet in failing to resolve the
conflict with Kennecott, and casting doubt upon the heretofore
formal necessity of market definition under section 7, the Court has
left the legal community in a state of suspense. 149
142 See 341 F. Supp. at 540, 543, 555-56.
143
 Id. at 545-56.
144
 78 F.T.C. at 797, 799 (Hearing Examiner).
145
 78 F.T.C. at 915. See text at note 124 supra.
146
 The discrepancy centers on the quantity of design stage competition. The FTC found
coal to have an advantage at this stage, 78 F.T.C. at 915, 916, whereas the district court
more convincingly found that coal was confronted with significant competition from other
fuels. 341 F. Supp. at 540, 545-55.
147 See notes 24, 133 supra.
141 Jurisdiction to enforce § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.. § 18 (1970), is given to the
Justice Department, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970), and to the Federal Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C.
§ 21(a) (1970).
149 However, it could be contended that there was a tacit market definition in General
Dynamics, for with whomever else United Electric competed in the past, it certainly com-
peted with other coal producers. Thus, the relevant product market had to include at least the
coal market. Arguably, both the resources defense and the traditional failing company
doctrine are self-defining of markets when applied to single product firms, even though
neither of them depends upon the market definition for its logical force. This is not true for a
multi-product firm, for then the viability of each line of the firm's business must be assessed
before the failing company doctrine can be applied. If the defense cannot be proved for the
entire operation, a full § 7 analysis, including market definitions, must be undertaken. See
Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines 12 (1968). As General Dynamics presented a single
product firm and an immediately successful defense which obviated further § 7 analysis, it
may have in truth been unnecessary for the Supreme Court to say more with regard to
product market: the facts said all that the law in this case required. Vet, in expressly declining
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CONCLUSION
The Court had hinted in the past that lack of essential resources
could mitigate an acquisition's otherwise probable anticompetitive
effect. But the tenor of the Court's analysis in General Dynamics
indicates that this decision was something other than the fulfillment of
a past promise. The resource defense is a meaningful creation in the
framework presented by the case, for if indeed United Electric had
no prospects of acquiring or discovering new coal reserves, then the
challenged merger was unlikely to result in a substantial anticom-
petitive effect. Time of merger inquiries should, under such cir-
cumstances, give way to the pragmatic realities present at the time
of the suit. And, because all companies concerned in the 1959
acquisition produced only coal, the Court's failure to confront the
issue of market definition is perhaps understandable, though cer-
tainly not laudable in view of the arguably erroneous Kennecott
precedent.' 5 °
But it will now require several more decisions to clarify the
Court's position. If, as seems likely, the resource defense is merely
the failing company doctrine modified to meet the peculiar and
practical considerations of the extractive industries, it should have
been labeled and restricted as such. If, on the other hand, General
Dynamics indicates a shift to active pursuit of "other considera-
tions," then while that change could have been more clearly
heralded, it still should prove a significant and beneficial decision.
STEVEN LENKOWSKY
to review the market definition of the district court, the Supreme Court in General Dynamics
has only added to the confusion.
13 ° See note 149 supra.
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